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Riassunto
Il tradizionale approccio della valutazione delle politiche si concentra principalmente su un
particolare parametro: in genere il treatment status, mentre una minore attenzione e` stata
volta verso i meccanismi attraverso i quali opera la politica in questione. Lo scopo principale
di questa tesi e` quello di acquisire di conoscenza dei meccanismi causali attraverso i quali una
politica per lo sviluppo produce un effetto. Utilizzo il contesto delle piccole economie dell’Africa
rurale, attraverso i due case study relativi ai progetti della Banca Mondiale (WB) nel campo
dello sviluppo economico in Nigeria e in Gambia.
Nella prima parte della tesi si considera un progetto WB della costruzione delle strade e si
propone una strategia per la derivazione del marginal treatment effect come un ingrediente
della l’interconnessione tra la costruzione delle strade, l’accesso ai mercati locali e il benessere
delle famiglie nelle piccole economie rurali. La mia ricerca parte dalla letteratura che crea
i ponti tra policy evaluation e approccio strutturale alla Heckman (2010) e fornisce una sua
applicazione nel contesto di economia dello sviluppo, dove la classica teoria economica spesso
non riesce a spiegare il comportamento degli individui. Dopo aver derivato ilmarginal treatment
effect dell’accesso al mercato al benessere delle famiglie, costruisco un setting per eseguire una
valutazione ex-ante della componente infrastrutturale del programma.
Nella seconda parte della tesi, considero il contesto di The Gambia Driven Development
Program per esplorare i mechanismi della formazione endogena delle reti sociali, definite dalle
dimensioni dello scambio economico informale tra le famiglie nei villaggi. Gli scambi che con-
sideriamo sono scambi tra le famiglie in termini di lavoro, credito, terra e mezzi di produzione.
L’obiettivo della ricerca e` duplice: condurre una ricerca empirica sfruttando i network sovra-
posti dello scambio economico, cercando di ottenere una maggiore comprensione del ruolo del
programma nella formazione delle reti sociali. L’obiettivo principale e` quello di distinguere l’-
effetto del programma che opera indirettamente sulla probabilita` di formare un link, attraverso
le modifiche delle preferenze individuali verso lo scambio economico.
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Abstract
The traditional policy evaluation approach mainly focuses on one specific policy parameter,
typically the treatment status, while less attention has been given to the mechanisms through
which development program operates. On the other hand, in recent econometric literature there
have been some significant developments in untangling the mechanisms of economic agents be-
havior, they shed light on preferences and technology parameters that are invariant to policy
changes. The core of the thesis is to unlock the policy parameters in a unique World Bank
programs in the challenging context of rural African economies, through acquiring knowledge
about the causal mechanisms driving the change induced by the economic development policy.
In the first part of the thesis, using a very unique setting of the World Bank infrastructure
development program, I propose the strategy for the construction of building blocks that can
be used as the ingredients of a structural system that explains the interconnection between
the roads construction, access to markets and households’ well being. I exploit the results
from the innovative structural literature and apply them in under-developed economies setting,
where standard economic theory often fails to explain the agents’s behavior. The goal is to
understand better the underlying developing economy principles, and to perform an ex-ante
evaluation of the road construction on complex mechanisms of market exchange and welfare
production function. This is interesting from both methodological and empirical point of view,
as there are very few studies that apply newly developed structural econometric tools on real
data. Moreover, in contrast to the carefully designed evaluations of many health and education
initiatives in developing countries, our knowledge about the impacts of infrastructure projects
has remained under-developed
In the second part of this thesis, I use the setting of The Gambia Community Driven
Development Program, to explore the endogenous social network formation, that defines the
dimensions of the informal economic exchange. The objective of the research is twofold: conduct
an empirical research on a very rich dataset on social networks in rural Gambia, using the setting
of the Community Driven Program Evaluation (CDDP) and focus on the endogenous link
formation.The second goal is to disentangle the effect of the program that operates indirectly
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on the probability of forming a link, through modifying the existing network attributes or
modifying exchange preferences of individuals; thus find convincing way to identify the program
effect on the distribution of individual and dyad fixed effects (preferences).
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Capitolo 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Development Impact Evaluation Initiative is a World Bank (WB) program that aims at
generating knowledge on the effectiveness of different small and large scale development poli-
cies. So far, there has been a substantial attention upon rigorous impact evaluation using
micro-data and exploiting widely accepted econometric tools through the traditional counter-
factual approach. It resulted in improving the quality of WB operations through iterative
learning and less risky scaling-up of the projects.
However, the traditional approach mainly focuses on one specific policy parameter, typically
the treatment status, while less attention has been given to the mechanisms through which de-
velopment program operates. The wide use of natural experiments in less developed countries
(LDP) has allowed to obtain the estimates that are not invariant to changes in the character-
istics of the policy itself and it is a ‘black box’ that rarely has the external validity in different
environments.
On the other hand, in recent econometric literature there have been some significant develop-
ments in untangling the mechanisms of economic agents behavior, they shed light on preferences
(or alternatively, on production technology parameters) that are invariant to policy changes.
This so-called structural approach relies explicitly on the well defined underlying economic
model and it offers tools that are used to simulate or predict changes in behavior, so that the
results can be extrapolated to different policy environments. Todd and Wolpin (2003) draw
a clear line between the definition of policy parameters and structural parameters using the
setting of cognitive achievement production function. More interestingly, in Todd and Wolpin
(2008) it is shown the structural parameters can be used in an ex-ante policy evaluation in
widely know development project in Mexico (PROGRESA).
This thesis is an attempt to explore how structural reasoning can be applied in two typical
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development policy evaluation settings. My focus mainly lies in the degree of isolation of rural
households as a mechanism through which an external shock, such as WB development project,
can modify preferences towards the economic exchange on one side and the cost ingredient of
the agricultural production function, on the other side.
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The first part of my thesis takes into consideration a geographical isolation of rural house-
holds in terms of their access to facilities, in particular access to markets. To address this
question, I use the context of Nigeria Commercial Agriculture Development Project - a five year
WB initiative that aims at strengthening agricultural production systems and targets small and
medium commercial farms through capacity building, information diffusion and infrastructure
building. The most interesting component of the project is the infrastructure component, that
allows for impact evaluation through randomized phasing-in of roads and power plants building.
I follow the pioneering work of Jacoby (2000) studies the relationship between road access to
the households’ nearest market and the value of land, using rural Nepal data. Since then, there
were many attempts to address the question of the impact of road construction and market
access on welfare (Van der Walle (2002) , Gonzales-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque (2010)).
Overall, the road construction literature argues that access to markets boosts income diversifi-
cation, raises technology adoption, lowers the cost of production and raises the competitiveness
of the households closer to the markets.
To explore this issues, I start from the assumption that the road construction reduces the cost
of reaching a market, as a locus of affairs, increasing its accessibility and raising the intensity
of market exchange. To overcome the endogenenity of the households’ choice to access the
market place and identify its causal effect on agricultural revenues, I use the real GIS calculat-
ed distance from the households to the markets as an exclusion restriction for market access.
This way, I construct a set-up of a structural model, that allows to identify the parameters of
agricultural production function, that would mimic the impact of the newly constructed roads
on the welfare outcomes, through improving access to market.
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The second part of this thesis builds upon the recent empirical literature regarding social
networks in development context. These suggest that one of the likely mechanisms through
which social programs affect welfare is through breaking and establishing new social equilibrium.
There were two main streams: one highlights the social processes behind risk sharing arrange-
ments and another deals with the models of information diffusion. Recent empirical studies
such as Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Dercon and Weerdt (2006) investigate whether the
risk sharing methods are formed in order to maximize the mutual gains from pooling income
risk. Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) examine the role of network structure in determining the
impact of labor sharing networks on outcomes. In terms of social networks as the key factor in
the transmission of information for technological innovations in agriculture, significant contri-
butions have been provided by Conley and Udry (2008) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006), while
Miguel and Kremer (2003) consider the use of innovative drugs in network-diffusion context.
Here I consider the survey designed for the evaluation of The Gambia Community Driven De-
velopment Program (CDDP). It is a five year joint WB funded project with the government of
The Gambia that is aimed at empowering and financing the communities to take lead in the
identification and implementation of their own development projects. It is a randomized exper-
iment designed survey, and very rich network data is collected both in treated and non-treated
areas.
The starting point of my research is the endogenous formation of different economic networks,
that typically overlap in rural economies. I build upon the pioneering work of Udry and Conley
(2004), followed by Arcand and Fafchamps (2008) who exploit the properties of dyadic model
framework to underline the importance in household similarities to engage in social interaction
in terms of economic exchange.
The main idea is to integrate the latent component into the dyadic framework in order to
account for the individual preferences over choices of social interaction. Data on different eco-
nomic overlapping networks allow for using a set of measures for the latent concept of the
propensity to exchange in the internal market (land, labor, tools and credit exchange). While
identification of the standard policy parameters (such as the average treated effect on the
treated on welfare indicators) can obtained through perfect randomization, the structural pa-
rameters I consider (individual preferences towards the economic exchange) are identified non
parametrically. Integrating latent component into the model complicates the estimation and
the GMM and the Conley (1999) variance estimator are abandoned in favor of semi-parametric
procedure and maximum likelihood estimator.
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1.2 Main contributions of the thesis
The core of the thesis is to unlock the policy parameters, through acquiring knowledge about
the causal mechanisms driving change that a policy development project has on the set of
defined outcomes. In this particular setting, the mechanisms are related to the degree of the
household integration, both in social informal exchanges as well as market interactions. To my
knowledge, due to data constraints, this aspect as not been studied in a consistent manner and
no causality has been claimed.
In chapter 2, using the context of a very innovative infrastructure evaluation design within
the Nigeria CADP, I provide an identification result exploiting the availability of GIS data on
distances between the households and the markets, and contribute to filling the gap in the
road evaluation literature, by estimating the causal effect of the isolation from the markets on
agricultural exchange and revenues.
In chapter 3, using the setting of the Gambia CDDP, I provide a non-parametric identification
result and I build a new estimation procedure that integrates the latent component into the
dyadic framework in order to account for the individual preferences over choices of social inter-
action. I derive a semi-parametric estimator of the individual propensity towards the internal
economic exchange, and compare their performance with the standard dyadic framework results.
13
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Capitolo 2
The causal foundations of structural
modeling and policy evaluation
2.1 What are the goals of causal inference?
The main tasks of of causal approach, as summarized by Heckman (2008), are:
Task Description Requirements
1 Defining the set of hypotheti-
cal/counterfactuals
Scientific Theory
2 Identification of causal parame-
ters from hypothetical population
data
Mathematical analysis of
point or set identification
3 Identifying parameters from real
data
Estimation and Testing the-
ory
Empirical studies of the relationship between welfare indicators and anti-poverty instru-
ments could be roughly divided in two main clusters: experimental and non experimental.
Both deal with the identification of the direction and magnitude of causality, as defined by
Granger (1969), with the necessity to test for the existence of causality in the first place.
The definition of causality in economical framework has evolved since 1969. Granger’s definition
of causality implies that:
• Let X and Y be two linear non-deterministic covariance-stationary stochastic processes,
such that Xt = a ∗ ut + b ∗ vt , Yt = c ∗ ut + d ∗ vt, where u and v are uncorrelated white
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errors with unit variance, and a, b, c, d disappears for t < 0, then Y does not cause X if
and only if a and b can be chosen identically 0.
• The assumption of strict exogeneity : If (X,Y) is written inn an autoregressive representa-
tion, Y can be expressed as a lag function of current and past values of X with a residual
that is not correlated with any past and future values of X, than Y does not cause X in
Granger’s sense.
Granger’s definition has been extended subsequently to allow for conditioning on covariates
and non-linear specification (see Chamberlain (1984) and Angrist and Kuersteiner (2004)). Re-
cently, asymmetric causality testing has been suggested in the literature in order to separate
the causal impact of positive changes from the negative ones (see Hatemi (2012)). However, al-
though theory evolved to accommodate for more general approach, its essence has not changed.
What results to be in continuous evolution even today is the focus on which parameters are to
be studied and the distinction between so-called policy effects or production function estimates
(See Heckman (1992 and 2000)). However, even though there are substantial differences in two
paradigms, lately there have been many attempts to build bridges between the two streams in
literature (See Heckman (2008) and Pearl (2012)).
This is exactly the econometric literature where the ideas that lie behind this thesis can be
nested.
2.2 Causal inference and policy effects
The traditional approach to policy evaluation focuses on total effect of one specific variable
(typically the treatment status) while little or no effort is made to understand the mechanism
through which treatment effects operate. Instead of explicit economic theory underlying models,
this approach exploits the paradigm of the randomized controlled trials and the object of
interest are the effects of (quasi) experiments rather than parameters of economic models. It
yields estimates such that the effect retrieved is not invariant to changes in the characteristics
of the policy under investigation. It is more about effects of causes than it is about causes of
effects (Heckman (2010)). Randomized trial is the gold standard paradigm, that allows the
counterfactual to be defined as the potential outcome of a hypothetical treatment D = d that
mimics the condition of the perfect experimental setting, ignoring the mechanisms that govern
that outcome.
Hence, the causal problem is interpreted as missing data, where potential outcomes under the
non treatment status are missing and potential outcome under the received treatments are
observed. Therefore, Y (X) can be understood as a latent variable that expresses its value only
16
when D = d, and can be written:
Y = dY1 + (1− d)Y0
Extrapolating the results driven from (quasi) experimental framework is only valid if the indirect
effects are expected to be the same on average in the new population.
The fact that the experiments do not generally recover parameters of the production function
is not always a limitation, as often the policy parameters answer directly the policy question,
and provide a way to estimate the desired parameters without additional assumptions.
2.3 Causal inference and structural parameters
A sharp contrast lies between economic parameters featured in structured approach and the
ones from the programme evaluation approach as they are derived from different paradigms. As
illustrated in the previous subsection, not all the interesting causal questions can be answered
from experimental studies. For that reasons, the representatives of structural models are after
different specific type of parameters, that reflect deep preference and technology attributes
that are invariant to policy changes. In particular, in policy evaluation setting these parame-
ters would help to answer the question of how would the environment change if a specific policy
is implemented.
This would guarantee an external validity of some (not all) parameters to policy changes, al-
lowing them to be interpreted even in a different policy environment. It is used to predict or
simulate changes in agents’ behavior, and it relies explicitly on the underlying assumptions from
the economic model. For example, if the goal is to estimate the effects of a new government
policy of incentives to technology adoption, the problem can be framed in the setting where
the policy affects the environment through lowering the price of production technology from p
to (1 + t)p.
How does dis work in practice? The core is in finding the adequate variability. Using the ex-
ample of incentives to technology adoption, this variability can be searched in time/region/unit
in which the the price in the actual status is equal to the new price after the policy gets imple-
mented. This can be used to make predictions about the effects of the program, all else being
equal condition maintained and assuming no general equilibrium effects.An instrument like this
provides the following answers:
• Evaluating the impact of already implemented interventions on certain outcomes
• Prediction of the impact of intervention implemented in one environment in different
environments
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• Forecasting the impact of interventions never historically experienced, by knowing the
mechanisms through which it works.
2.4 Notation and basic definitions
In microeconometric literature, Roy model and its extensions have been widely accepted. It
accommodates the idea of hypothetical outcomes, where the space of potential or so-called
counterfactual outcomes is well defined by economic theory. Let us consider an economy
where agents face, for simplicity, only two potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) with the distribution
FY0,Y1(y0, y1) , where typically 0 refers to no treatment state and 1 stands for treatment state.
We have that y0, y1 is a realization of random variables Y0, Y1. Unlike the Schrodinger’s Cat
paradox 1, economic agents cannot experience both potential outcomes at the same time. What
is observed is either Y0 or Y1, and this is what is called the central policy evaluation prob-
lem.
Roy model also defines agent decision rules, so that the observed outcomes are not necessarily a
random sample of the FY0,Y1 distribution. It could be that the agent selects into the treatment
if Y1¿Y0+C, where C is a cost of selecting into the treatment. In that case we have the decision
rule:
D = 1(Y1 − Y0 − C > 0).
The the outcome for any person can be written as:
Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0.
It is important to notice that policy interventions operate either through shifting the potential
outcomes (Y0, Y1) or through changing the cost C. Agents make subjective evaluation about
the ex-post outcomes (Y0, Y1), therefore Roy model also distinguishes between the ex-post out-
comes and ex-ante outcomes E(Y0|ℑ) and E(Y1|ℑ), where ℑ is the information set that an
agent possesses before the treatment. This implies that even if we were able to measure the
individual treatment effect, the mare difference Y1 − Y0 does not reveal anything about the ex
ante subjective evaluation of ex post cost assessment.
2.5 Parameters of interest
Since it is almost impossible to come up with a plausible identification of the individual-level
treatment effects, without making some extreme assumptions, econometricians typically focus
1Erwin Schrdinger uses a cat paradox to explain a theory of quantum mechanics called indeterminacy.
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on identifying population level parameters, such as:
• Average Treatment Effect ATE = E(Y1 − Y0)
• Average Treatment Effect on the Treated ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1)
• Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated ATU = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 0)
These parameters were widely accepted and used in policy evaluation literature. However,
the parameter that has acquired a lot of attention more recently even in empirical responds to
a question of marginal returns to policy. In the previously presented mode, it is identified by
observing the agents that are indifferent between D = 1 or D = 0. A detailed problem setting
that conducts to the construction of marginal treatment effects will be explained in section 3.3.
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2.6 Why empirical research in development economics?
Nelson Mandela in his famous speech in London’s Trafalgar Square for the campaign against
poverty in the developing world has said :In this new century, many of the world’s poorest
countries remain imprisoned, enslaved and in chains. They are trapped in the prison of poverty.
It is time to set them free. Like slavery and apartheid, poverty is not natural. It is man-made
and it can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings.
Recently, many researchers engaged in empirical studies in development economics have put
some substantial effort to disentangle the channels through which anti-poverty programs can
reach the poorest ones. Personally, I strongly believe that it is necessary to put effort in
this direction. The diversity of experience of the poor countries development programs is
so heterogeneous that it makes it rather difficult to generalize the knowledge in any reliable
economic theory. While for the richer countries, the agents’ choices could be represented using
standard microeconomic models that conserve external validity in many contexts - this is hardly
the case for the underdeveloped areas, partly because the size of the population living in poverty
is much larger and more heterogeneous in terms of their social, geographical and institutional
characteristics.
In the empirical part of the thesis I will use the econometric instruments from the previously
described structural policy evaluation approach to build a model structure that allows for better
comprehension of the social and geographical isolation as a potential channel through which
anti-poverty programs could be more successfully fostered and review what has been done so
far in terms of causal inference.
20
Capitolo 3
Rural roads access, markets and
welfare
Is access to markets a road to welfare in rural Nigeria? In this chapter, using a very unique
setting of the World Bank infrastructure development program, I propose a strategy for the
construction of building blocks that can be used as the ingredients of a structural system that
explains the interconnection between the roads construction, access to markets and welfare
indicators. I exploit results from the innovative structural literature, described in chapter 2
and apply them in a very challenging development setting, where standard economic theory
often fails to explain the agents’s behavior. This way, I will be able not only to understand
better the underlying developing economy principles, but I can perform an ex-ante impact
evaluation of the road construction on market exchange and, subsequently, on the well being
of the households. This is interesting from both methodological and empirical point of view,
as there are very few studies that apply newly developed structural econometric tools on real
data. Moreover, in contrast to the carefully designed evaluations of many health and education
initiatives in developing countries, our knowledge about the impacts of infrastructure projects
has remained under-developed, and this makes it even more challenging.
3.1 Literature review
In most developing countries, highways and paved motorized roads compose only a small frac-
tion of national road network, while trails, footpaths, tracks and other secondary roads are
the ones most commonly used outside urban areas. These non motorized rural roads allow
for transit of people, products and production factors, they are characterized by low quality
standards and historically have received only marginal part of the national budget allocated
to road construction and rehabilitation (see Escobal and Ponce 2002). Inadequate roads raise
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transport costs and limit the access of households to local products and labor markets, educa-
tion and health facilities, and this is especially true during the heavy rainy seasons when the
most isolated households remain completely cut out from the community life and exchange.
Only recently, both the attention of researchers and policy makers has shifted to small scale
rural infrastructure projects with greater recognition of the relationship between high transport
cost and poverty (World Bank (2007)).
3.1.1 Poverty and access to roads
The evolution of econometric literature dealing with measurement of road benefits has gone
through three major phases in the last two decades. It started with thr macro perspective of the
relation between welfare and rural infrastructure (see Donovan (1992) and Lipton and Ravallion
(1995)). They claim positive impact South East Asian countries where a huge increase in rural
infrastructure investments has lead to economic growth and reduction in rural poverty.
After the 2000, there has been some growing interest in exploring road benefits at micro-level.
Jacoby (2000) has developed a methodology for estimating road benefits at the level of house-
holds, exploiting the relationship between the value of farmland and its distance to agricultural
markets, confirming the beneficial role of road networks on peasants welfare in terms of agricul-
tural wages. He conducts an empirical analysis on data from Nepal to address the issue of the
relationship either between the farmland value and distance to market or wages and distance to
market relationship through semi parametric estimation of parameters. Fafchamps and Shilpi
(2007) address the question about relative consumption of highly isolated Nepalese households
with difficulties accessing the markets, arguing that markets foster competition between indi-
viduals, thereby undermining redistributive institutions and values (risk pooling mechanisms).
Often, construction sites are selected in such manner to maximize social benefit of the invest-
ment, by selecting places with both high poverty and economic potential. Van der Walle (2002)
provides a critical review on how the rural road investments are selected in Vietnam, within a
cost effectiveness paradigm. This implies that often the road evaluation strategy suffers from
endogeneity problem. This issue has been directly addressed by Dinkelman (2008) (see also
Duflo and Pande (2007)), who shows that access to rural electrification has an impact on pro-
duction technologies and market employment. He uses the two wave panel data on communities,
and exploits the variation in the projects roll-out that occurred due to some technological con-
straints. While district’s fixed effects control the differences in local labor market conditions,
he instruments the project placement with the land gradient. The cost factors are central to
identification strategy and the costs depend heavily on proximity and access to existing power
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lines, population density of the settlement and finally, the land gradient and terrain.
However, at this stage the literature has offered a very scarce evidence of the causal link be-
tween the infrastructure and welfare at the household level. One attempt to fill in the gap in the
research about the merits of infrastructure can be found in Gonzales-Navarro and Quintana-
Domeque (2010). They use the data from the infrastructure experiment in Mexico to evaluate
the impact of street pavement on the professional and households’ appraisal of property values.
They find that the provision of street pavement not only raises the housing and land values but
also influences household outcomes such as ownership of vehicles and durable goods. Moreover,
they find evidence of a significant impact on credit markets, which acts as the channel through
which the street pavement influences durable goods increase. They are the to first deal with
the problem of selection bias in the infrastructure placement since infrastructure is likely to
be allocated to places with high probability of largest returns, solving the endogeneity and ob-
taining identification through randomization. Escobal and Ponce (2008) focus on income and
consumption as welfare indicators for rural households in Peru, finding an impact on income
from wage-employment sources but not in consumption levels, arguing that the road quality
improvement has been perceived as transitory.
3.1.2 Access to markets
While in both theoretical and empirical literature it results pretty clear that there is evidence
about the positive relationship between road construction and poverty reduction at the mi-
cro and macro level, it is not clear what is the mechanism through which road construction
generates long run positive impact on household welfare. A very interesting theoretical article
by Cannon and Liu (1997) addressed the question about the mechanisms through which road
infrastructure generates poverty reduction and argue that it allows for lower production and
transaction costs and encouraging economic exchange and foster production and labor special-
ization. On the other hand, market development has always been seen as a progress generator.
Over the last couple of decades, the literature on rural development has highlighted the role
of interlinked transactions between economic agents as a proxy of the underlying institutional
setting, that explains the elasticity of the rural poor behavior to policy instruments. One of
the seminal works that attempted to explain some paradoxes in peasants pervasive behavior
can be found in Fachamps at al. (1991), where the non responsiveness of the peasants to price
incentives to technology adoption has been explained through the structuralist missing mar-
kets model. They argue that the elasticity of peasant household response to price incentives
is an important condition for any agricultural development program and they indicate several
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channels through which this elasticity can be altered, one of which is the correction of market
failure (in the extreme case - missing markets).
Finally, empirical literature, such as Mu and Van der Walle (2009), provides evidence of
road rehabilitation on market development. In this particular case, standard counterfactual
paradigm has been used through difference-indifferences setting combined with the propensity
score matching to highlight significant average impact on the market growth in rural Vietnam.
They also suggest that poorer zones have higher impacts due to lower level of initial market
development. Evidence that the poorest commercial farmers would benefit the most from low-
ering cost of transportation and having better access to markets can be found in Fafchamps
and Hill (2005).
To conlude, I have considered three waves of development literature - the one that deals with
road construction impact on the local and households welfare, the one that deals with empiri-
cal evidence of how missing markets can be a reason for the failure of the public anti-poverty
programs and finally the literature considering roads construction as an engine of market devel-
opment. Yet, I found no research that binds the three pieces of evidence together in a unique
cause and effect system, that allows for a clear interpretation of the mechanisms through which
public expenditure on rural infrastructure helps alleviating the poverty in the isolation zones.
3.2 Problem setting
To fix ideas, we can consider Y1 as the level well being that would be encountered by the
household if it involves in an economic exchange on the market (D = 1), and Y0 if does not
(D = 0). Let V be household utility, assumed to be absolutely continuous. Let Z be an
instrument such that it can be manipulated by policy maker (i.e. road construction), and
implicitly it directly impacts the cost of reaching the market.
D = ✶(µD(Z) > V )
For the moment, the conditioning on a set of observable characteristics X is assumed invariant
with respect to the policy implementation status, and is left implicit. We can also define a
propensity score:
P [Z] = P [D = 1|Z] = P [µD(Z) > V ] = FV [µD(Z)]
and it follows that
D = ✶(FV [µD(Z)] > FV [V ]) = ✶(P [Z] > UD)
where UD is random variable normally distributed over[0, 1], and V is assumed to be absolutely
continuous. Note that P [Z] can be considered as a propensity score of agent accessing the
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market. Hence we can define agents at the margin of indifference as those for whom it us true
that:
P [Z] = UD
and this would exactly replicate the traditional Heckman selection model. The variables Z
come on top of X and satisfy the usual exclusion restriction, that is:
(Y1, Y0, V )⊥Z|X
In the setting like that, let us define Db the market engagement choice and Y b as individuals’
welfare in the status quo (under the current environment and policy regime), where:
Y b = Y b1D
b + Y b0 (1−D
b)
and similarly, for the well being of the compounds after the implementation of a new policy,
that acts on D by facilitating access to markets by, say, reducing the cost to reach the market.
Then we have that:
Y a = Y a1 D
a + Y 10 (1−D
a)
The policy effect that we are interested in is the ex ante effect on population well being that
results from a marginal change in the policy instrument Z (i.e. road improvement that facili-
tates access to market).
Under the conditions stated, it is possible to obtain the marginal treatment effect
(MTE):
∂E[Y |P [Z] = p]
∂p
= E[Y1 − Y0|UD = p] (3.1)
with E[Y1 − Y0|UD = p] being the return for the marginal agent who is indifferent to accessing
the market once his propensity score is set to p. A very important implication is that Z affects
the outcome variable only through acting on the propensity score. This means that, in the
absence of general equilibrium effects, MTE is invariant to a set of alternative policies that
could affect the values taken by propensity score P [Z].
MTE is an important building block for many policy parameters (ATE, ATT and LATE,
defined in section 2, can be derived from MTE), but above all, it is an essential ingredient
for ex-ante evaluation. Suppose that the policy acts on Z by marginally reducing the cost of
accessing the markets from η to η− ǫ. Let F bP [Z](p) be the distribution of P [Z] at the baseline,
and analogously F aP [Z](p) the corresponding distribution under the new policy regime. Than it
is possible to show that:
E(Y a − Y b) =
∫ 1
0
MTE(p)[F bP [Z](p)− F
a
P [Z](p)]dp
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If we consider a variant of a policy such that Za = Zb + ǫ then:
lim
ǫ→0
E[Y a − Y b]
represents what would happen to the welfare of households if a road construction program
reduces the cost of accessing the markets, holding everything else fixed.
3.3 Estimation method
For the estimation of single components of the setting described in the previous section (propen-
sity score and MTE), I constructed upon the Robinsons’s double residual methodology. If we
considered a general model of the type:
yi = β0 + xiβ + f(zi) + ǫi (3.2)
where yi is the value taken by the outcome for the individual i, xi is a row vector of
characteristics, and ǫi is the disturbance assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. If
we apply a conditional expectation on both sides, we have that:
E(yi|zi) = E(xi|zi)β + f(zi)+ (3.3)
By subtracting (2) from (1) we have that:
yi − E(yi|zi) = (xi − E(xi|zi)β + f(zi) + ǫi (3.4)
If the conditional expectations are unknown, they can be estimated by using some consistent
estimators yi = my(zi) + ǫ1i and xi = mx(zi) + ǫ2i. Therefore the final model to estimate is:
yi − mˆy(zi) = (xi − mˆx(zi))β + ǫi (3.5)
where xi − mˆx(zi) is a row vector of the differences between each explanatory variable and the
fitted conditional expectation of x given Z. The estimated coefficients vector is therefore:
βˆ =
(∑
i
(xi − mˆx(zi))
′(xi − mˆx(zi))
)
−1∑
i
(xi − mˆx(zi))((yi − mˆy(zi))
with variance, if errors are iid with zero mean and σ2ǫ
V ar(βˆ) = σ2ǫ
(∑
i
(xi − mˆx(zi))
′(xi − mˆx(zi))
)
−1
Since the parameter vector β is estimated, we can fit the non linear relation between yi and
zi (4) non parametrically:
yi − xβˆ = β0 + f(zi) + ǫi. (3.6)
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3.4 Nigeria Commercial Agriculture Development Pro-
gram
3.4.1 Program description
Nigeria’s Commercial Agriculture Development Project (CADP) is supporting the Federal Gov-
ernment of Nigeria strategy options of diversifying into non-oil sources of growth and away from
over dependence on oil and gas. It aims at strengthening agricultural production systems for
targeted value chains among small and medium scale commercial farmers in five participating
states in the country, and is being is being implemented in the states of Kaduna, Kano, Enugu,
Cross River and Lagos. The total number of beneficiaries expected to directly participate in
the project is estimated at 50,000 (10,000 per state) over a period of five years. Small and
medium commercial farms will benefit directly through capacity building, technology demon-
stration and dissemination, access to matching grants and infrastructure, while households will
benefit indirectly through access to farm and feeder roads and markets. One of the impor-
tant sub-components of the program is rural electrification, that will support the provision of
electricity to commercial farms where high transmission line exists. This project will finance
the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural electricity, including provision of transformers and
distribution, feeder lines, poles and accessories from the main transmission lines to commercial
farmers facilities in collaboration with the Power Sector Reform Project.
The CADP will be constructing or rehabilitating about 500 kilometers of farm access roads
and drainage structures per state in order to connect commercial farms and surrounding com-
munities to the major road networks. It will provide resources for construction of new roads,
rehabilitation of existing ones and maintenance of roads to communities and selected agricul-
tural activities. The goal is to provide a better connection of the commercial farms to the local
markets. This is obtained through Outputs and Performance Based Road Contracts.
CADP is very market oriented. Its future goal is the creation of domestic and export mar-
kets; this will support market development, awareness and knowledge sharing for commercial
farmers. It will finance market information system, including market price surveys, website
and information kiosks, market/financial linkages, (including promotion of products for supply
chain financing, use of crops as collateral) quality control measures and standards; food safety,
exchange programs, agricultural trade fairs and shows, local and international study tours.
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3.4.2 Data
The data was collected through the ad-hoc survey conducted by National Bureau of Statistics,
under the supervision of Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (Trento) and
the World Bank. The collection went through two major phases: first the catchment areas
were defined as areas around the road construction site where potential road beneficiaries live,
fixing the radious around the treated area. It was followed by the so-called listing survey - a
census of the households within the catchment areas, done in 2010. Then, during the following
year, approximately one fourth of the households in five states was randomly selected to enter
the baseline sample. Very rich and detailed information was collected about individual level
demographics, education, schooling, labor and employment, time allocation to other activities,
and access to markets and facilities, production, sales, expenditures and credit market access.
Moreover, the survey collected tracking data for each household within the evaluation sample
in order to follow households through the follow-up surveys, and global positioning system
(GPS) information for each household and each of their plots. The final sample includes 4241
households and 27320 individuals.
Around 14 % of the questionnaires were collected in Kaduna, while in all other states this
number is almost equally distributed and it amounts for about 21%. Most of the enumerated
households cultivate land, in all the participating states, except Lagos state where the propor-
tion of those not cultivating land exceeds land cultivators.
The primary source of electricity for domestic use is the public grid. While a very small pro-
portion of households in Lagos state have no source of domestic electricity, the proportion of
households without any source of domestic electricity is very high in Kano at 34%, and be-
tween 9% to 13% in the other states. A vast and overwhelming majority of households have
no access to any source of electricity for their farms and enterprises. Over 85% of households
in Enugu and over 90% of households in Kano, Kaduna and Cross River states have no source
of electricity for non-domestic use.
In each state, a majority of households use the main road as the fastest means of accessing
markets, irrespective of whether they visit the market daily, weekly or monthly. Households
which are the most geographically isolated with respect to the time required to reach the near-
est market are characterized by lower levels of the commonly employed indicators of well being.
For example, using GIS data from Lagos we found negative association between consumption
and income, and distance from markets. The same negative relationship with geographic iso-
lation is found when energy adoption is considered. (see appendix A1 for the selected list of
descriptive statistics.)
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3.5 Empirical results
CADP baseline data provides a very rich ‘photography’ of characteristics and activities of
rural households, however final sample contains very different dimension of farm production.
Therefore, I consider the sub-sample of 1324 peasants involved in crop value chain production
(maize, rice, cocoa, palm oil), and leave out the production of livestock and fisheries. This
choice is motivated by the fact that the production process, its seasonality and production
technology is rather heterogeneus between livestock and crops. There are many indicators of
households’ well being that could be derived, however the welfare indicators I have considered
are short term income, labor intensity and education expenditure. The reason for this selection
stands in the nature of the policy that we are evaluating. The roads that are to be constructed
are small rural roads - they connect the farms to the closest motorized roads, or to the nearest
market. Most of the time the length of the road does not exceed 5km and sometimes roads are
not even being constructed from zero - few of them were just rehabilitated. Therefore, I expect
that this kind of intervention should not have general equilibrium effects (i.e. on prices of goods
and services). The idea, supported by the literature review, is that the improved/constructed
road access reduces the time and cost of going to the market, and this reflects on the short
term labor market outcomes such as the hours worked or the total pay of workers. Also, I expect
some intra household redistributive effects, for example the reduction in transport expenditure
could allow for an increase in the education expenditure. In future research, other welfare
outcomes will be taken in consideration.
As explained at the very beginning of this chapter, the channel I am considering is the market
access. For rural households, markets are not just places of exchange of goods and services -
these are usually meeting points, information exchange engines and are often situated near other
types of local institutions (such as schools, hospitals, ecc.).In our sample, most peasants know
where the market is and it is rather tricky to find a suitable indicators of market access. Even
though we have the information on how often household members go to the nearest market,
its usace could be misleading, since individuals could declare to go to the market every day
but this would NOT mean that they have commercial reasons of accessing it. Since we are
interested in exploring the hypothesis of lowering the cost of accessing markets, this could be
more transparent if market is defined as a place of some kind of economic exchange, related
to farmers activity, than if we use the broader market access definition. It follows that the
indicators of market access are the following:
• Dummy that indicates whether the household sells on the market
• Ratio of the quantity sold on the market over the total quantity harvested
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• Ratio of the value sold on the market over the total harvest value.
While the first indicator is more straightforward in defining the market access, the second
and the third are indended to be the proxies of market activity intensity measure.
The availability of GIS data on the exact latitute and longitude position of the compounds
on one hand and the markets on another, has allowed us to obtain the measure of the real
distances (in miles and minutes) that necessary if a peasant wants to arrive from compounds
to the markets. Both motorized road and small rural roads are considered as possible paths in
the calculus algorithm. This is important because the distances we calculate have to mimic the
changes in road networks that will happen after the CADP full scale implementation.
In order to control for the density of economic activity we use administrative area dummies,
as well as the number of markets available in the range of 20miles of euclidean distance radius
(see appendix A.1 for an example of the utility of the Global Positioning System).
3.5.1 Isolation and welfare
I begin by exporing the relationship between the selected welfare indicators and the distance
from the markets. Since the preliminary graphical analysis has indicated that this relation-
ship might not be linear, semi-parametric estimation seemed to be a reasonable choice, using
Robinson double residuals method (as in section 3.3). I control for many pre-program observ-
able characteristics, such as age, gender, literacy and formal education of the household head,
household demographic structure, commodity interest group membership, crop, total area culti-
vated, the number of active markets within a 20 miles radius and controlling for administrative
area effects.
The welfare indicators presented in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are, respectivelly, the individuals´last
pay , labor intensity expressed in the length of the last working period and per child education
expenditure. It appears that all three indicators are inversely correlated to the market distance.
This means that further the compounds are from the market place, they have shorter working
intervals/are less payed. Also, the education expenditure decreases with household isolation,
as expected.
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Figura 3.1: Semi parametric estimation of the correlation between the distance from
the nearest markets and the last salary perceived by the HH head
Figura 3.2: Semi parametric estimation of the correlation between the distance from
the nearest markets and the length of the last payed working interval
3.5.2 Isolation and access to market - propensity score estimation
I start with the simplest indicator: a binary outcome that indicates whether the household,
prior to the baseline, has sold on the market. Hence, as before, I begin by regressing semi-
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Figura 3.3: Semi parametric estimation of the effect of distance from the nearest
market and education expenditure.
parametrically the decision D to sell to the market on the log of average distance from the 5
closest markets. We can see the result in Figure 3.4: as expected it is less likely that the most
isolated households sell on the market. There is some rumour at the first and last quantiles of
distances distribution, but the slope of the relationship emerges quite clearly. Note that what
we have obtained here is the propensity score of selling on the market, given the observable
characteristics and the distance.
3.5.3 Isolation and access to market - MTE estimation
Once that the propensity score has been estimated, I proceed with the semi-parametric estima-
tion of the MTE distribution. I follow the procedure described in section 3.3, and I use the three
welfare indicators as outcome variables. What I obtain can be seen in figure 3.5. We observe
that higher the propensity score, that is higher the probability of engaging in market activi-
ty, higher are the labor market outcomes, and also per child education expenditure increases.
This is pretty much what is expected. One of the possible explanation is that market place
differentiate the labor engagement, so that it becomes more likely for the farmers to diversify
the sources of income, that helps the income continuity and prevents from risk (crop loss, bad
year, ecc.).
However, even though crop sell indicator is simple and intuitive, it suffers from the problem
of scarse support, since the instrumental variation in distance Z does not span the propensity
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Figura 3.4: Semi parametric estimation of the effect of distance from the nearest
market to probability to sell
score over the full unit interval.
Figura 3.5: Semi parametric estimation of the marginal treatment effect of market
access to selected welfare outcomes
The support problem is solved if we use another proxy for market activity (see figure 3.7).
The first option is to use the fraction of quantity sold over total quantity harvested. The
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Figura 3.6: The distribution of the estimated propensity score
original indicator is contiuous in a range (0, 1), but it can be dichotomized in order to fit the
original idea of market access: if the household sells more than about 60% of its harvest (the
median value)- it can be considered as intense market activity and the farm can be defined
as strongly market-oriented. If the sale share is less than the median, the compound can be
considered as one with less access to market exchange. We can see from the Figure 7.8 that
the slope is not so large in the case of last pay, while the MTE is larger in the case of length of
the last working interval and education expenditure.
The second option of approximating the intensity of the household’s activity on the market
is to consider the ratio of the value sold (in Naira) and estimated value harvested. In terms of
interpretation, it is rather similar to the previous indicator, what changes is the measurement
unit. Assuming constant average prices in the catchment areas, even this variabile can be
dichotomised without losing any generality. I use the same rule with the cutt-off of defined as
the median ratio. The results follow in the Figures 7.9 and 7.10. The propensity score has a
much better coverage of (0, 1) interval, while the MTE distribution is rather similar to the ones
found in Figure 7.7.
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Figura 3.7: The distribution of the estimated propensity score
Figura 3.8: The distribution of the estimated MTE
3.6 Future research
Once that I have clean setting to refer to and coherent and complete data and once that I have
a clear signal of structural relationship between the three variables of interes (roads, markets
and welfare), next step would be to numericaly derive the distribution of MTE and obtain the
empirical counterpart of the ex-ante estimator. Later on, I would like to reproduce the findings
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Figura 3.9: The distribution of the estimated propensity score
Figura 3.10: The distribution of the estimated MTE
in different settings of farmers production function, in order to assess the external validity of
our results on a small scale. This is important, since a policy like this would soon be scaled-up
and CADP policy makers have the urge to obtain the first results, without waiting for the
follow-up survey. Hence, ex-ante evaluation could be a good compromise between the impact
evaluation rigirousity and practical need of the stakeholders involved in the project.
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Capitolo 4
Social Isolation and Community Driven
Development Programs
Economic behavioral theory teaches that the choice of engaging in any transaction depends both
on the observed and measurable characteristics of actors and their unobserved preferences. In
this particular context, we distinguish between the individual propensity to engage in internal
market transactions and the propensity of a specific couple of households to exchange. The
objective of the research is twofold: conduct an empirical research on a very rich dataset on so-
cial networks in rural Gambia, using the setting of the Community Driven Program Evaluation
(CDDP) and focus on the impact of program on the link formation. More importantly, the goal
is to disentangle the effect of the program that operates indirectly on the probability of forming
a link, through modifying the existing network attributes or modifying exchange preferences
of individuals; thus find convincing way to identify the program effect on the distribution of
individual and dyad fixed effects (preferences), by construction of a structural model that relies
upon reasonable assumptions.
4.1 Literature review
In the last decade there has been a growing interest of studying the the embededdness of
economic activity in social settings has been fundamental to sociologists for some time, following
the work of Granovetter (1985). Jackson (2008) draws a a parallel to the recent rise of interest in
behavioral economics, which comes upon the realization that a deeper structural underpinnings
of human behavior can help enrich the modeling of economic decision makers.
A very interesting social network flavored research has been done in the context of development
economics. The topics regarding risk pooling and information and innovation diffusion have
been of major interest, and both have the common ingredient - the network as a measurement of
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social capital through which risk are shared or information about new technologies diffused. In
correspondence to these two research interests, empirical literature divides in two main streams:
one highlights the social processes behind risk sharing arrangements and another deals with
the models of information diffusion.
Recent empirical studies such as Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Dercon and Weerdt (2006)
investigate whether the risk sharing methods are formed in order to maximize the mutual
gains from pooling income risk. Krishnan and Sciubba (2009) examine the role of network
structure in determining the impact of labor sharing networks on outcomes. In terms of social
networks as the key factor in the transmission of information for technological innovations
in agriculture, significant contributions have been provided by Conley and Udry (2008) and
Bandiera and Rasul (2006), while Miguel and Kremer (2003) consider the use of innovative
drugs in network-diffusion context.
4.2 A First Specification
In this section we first define some basic social network analysis concepts, that would later be
related with econometric literature and methodology.
4.2.1 Basic definitions
Social network analysis can be defined as mapping and measuring of relationships and flows
between people, groups or other connected information/knowledge entities.The nodes in the
network are the households while the links show relationships or flows between the nodes.
• Let us define lij = 1 if there is a link between two households, and 0 otherwise.
• Houseehold degree is defined as the count of the number of ties to other actors in the
network di(g
m) =
∑
j lij.
4.2.2 Specification at Household level
Let Y
(int)
s be an indicator for the internal exchange across the dimension s and let Y
(ext)
s be
an indicator for the external exchange. Moreover, let Z and W be the vectors of, respective-
ly, individual and village level characteristics. Let ui be the preference towards the internal
exchange and eis the idiosyncratic error term. For the internal exchange we have that:
Y
(int)
is = α0 + α1zi + α2wi + ui + eis (4.1)
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For the external exchange we have that:
Y
(ext)
is = γ0 + γ1zi + γ2wi − ui + eis (4.2)
4.2.3 Specification at Dyad level
Let Y
(s)
ij be the outcome undirected adjacency matrix for s economical exchange, where i and
j are indices for individuals. Let Z and W be vectors of village and link related attributes,
respectively and let ui be the propensity towards the internal exchange, and uij be the ij
specific exchange propensity.Let the following dyadic regressions be defined (as in Fafchamps
and Gubert (2006) and Arcand and Fafchamps (2008)):
Y
(s)
ij = β0 + β1|zi − zj|+ β2(zi + zj) + β3wij + ui + uj + uij + ǫij, (4.3)
The parameters β are informative about the structure of the network that is related to the
matrix Y . If it weren’t for the preferences, reduced-form regression (3) could be estimated by
a simple OLS method/ML method, adjusting standard errors to account for the correlation
across rows/columns of the matrix.
In this setting, we exploit the multidimensional nature of the available data, hence use jointly
information different Y ’s to derive sufficient conditions that allow identification, and thus to
learn about any change induced by the CDDP intervention. The final goal is to use more
flexible models in (1) and (2), i.e. use a non-parametric or semi-parametric approach to obtain
the distribution of uij and ui.
4.2.4 Dyads and basic inference
As far as the inference related to the dyadic regressions goes, the standard literature suggests
the standard errors to be estimated using using Conley’s Cluster Covariance Estimator (CCCE)
Cluster covariance estimators are used with data that has a group structure with independence
across groups. Using individual level observation, we can write the estimator as:
AV ar(βˆ) =
1
N −K
(X ′X)−1

 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
[
mijkl
2N
Xijuiju
′
klXkl]

 (X ′X)−1
where:
• N is the number of dyadic observations.
• X is the vector of all the regressors, Xij is the vector of dyad specific regressors.
• mijkl = 1 if the dyads in question have common elements, and hence are correlated (if i = k,
j = l, i = l or j = k), and 0 otherwise.
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As a non parametric alternative, quadratic assignment procedure can be used.
4.2.5 One useful descriptive tool: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition allows for the first decomposition of the total effect into endowment
effect (change in X) and coefficients difference effect (change in β). It is often used to explain gen-
der gap in labor economics literature regarding career outcomes. Let the following potential dyadic
regressions be defined for the matrix Y
Y
(1)
ij = β0 + β1|z
(1)
i − z
(1)
j |+ β2(z
(1)
i + z
(1)
j ) + β3w
(1)
ij + u
(1)
ij ,
Y
(0)
ij = β˜0 + β˜1|z
(0)
i − z
(0)
j |+ β˜2(z
(0)
i + z
(0)
j ) + β˜3w
(0)
ij + u
(0)
ij .
It is easy to show that:
∆Y = (β0 − β˜0) + β1|z
(1)
i − z
(1)
j | − β˜1|z
(0)
i − z
(0)
j |
+ β2(z
(1)
i + z
(1)
j )− β˜2(z
(0)
i + z
(0)
j )
+ β3w
(1) − β˜3w
(0) + ǫ
In this setting, I will use it to decompose the total effect of the exogenous shock provided by the World
Bank CDDP onto the propensity to exchange - into the change due to the households characteristics
and change due to different drive (β) that the program has onto the outcome. (see Appendix A.2 for
details.)
4.3 Model specification
4.3.1 Factor analysis
The main idea that lies behind the factor model is to use a set of measures for the latent concept of
the propensity to exchange in the internal market. The measures we can use are the actual exchange
along the four economic dimensions. The joint variation among there measures is divided into the
common part θ and the random part ǫ. All the economic questions depend in a different manner on
the latent factor - therefore each question can have a different factor loading, which can be interpreted
as a coefficient of the latent factor in the regression of a link on the latent factor.
Let L be the dummy that indicates whether the individual i has an external link, while Y is a
dummy that indicates whether a pair of individuals in the same village have a link. Let ∗Y and ∗L be
their latent analogous quantities. There are repeated measures on these individuals/pairs represented
by k = 4 different dimensions of economic exchange (land, labor, production tools and credit). Let
θ be a latent factor, that can be interpreted as a propensity to exchange in the internal market, and
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let δ be the pair specific propensity to exchange. We can construct the following simple simultaneous
equation model for the internal links:
Y kij = 0, 1
∗Y kij = λ
k(θi + δij) + τij
as well as for the external links:
Lkij = 0, 1
∗Lki = λ
k(−θi) + ǫi
where ǫ and τ are simple uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors.
4.3.2 Identification
the identification of factor models is based on the covariance matrix of the items:
Cov(∗Y ) = ΛΣfΛ
′ +Ω
and
Cov(∗l) = ΛΣfΛ
′ + E
where Λ is a matrix of loadings, Σf is a variance-covariance matrix of the factors, and Ω and E
are diagonal matrices of ‘uniqueness’ variances of idiosyncratic terms. The assumption I make are:
θ⊥ǫ, ω
ǫ, ω ≈ N(0, σ)
Therefore, we need to identify L = 2 ∗ k = 8 factor loadings for L = 8 items and a variances of the
factor θ and θ+ δ, and the two variances of the error terms - which makes 12 parameters to estimate.
Therefore we have
L(L− 1)
2
≥ 12
which is the identification condition, and actually we have that:
8(8− 1)
2
≥ 12.
4.4 Model specification in our case
Let k denote different exchange types, (i, j) are the households, and Yijk is a dummy that indicates
whether the household i and j exchange over the k dimension.
Y ∗ijk = λk(αi + αj + αij) + Uijk
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where:
Yijk = I(Y
∗
ijk ≥ 0)
In the simplest formulation, we can assume (αij , αi, αj) are independent across individuals and copulas
and from Ukij . Moreover, Uij⊥Urs for i 6= r and r 6= s. Under these conditions, standard results imply
that the distributions of Uki and Ui are non-parametrically identified, by Kotlarski theorem.
4.4.1 Identification
Theorem 4.4.1. (Kotlarski’s Theorem) If T s1 = θ1 + v1 and T
s
2 = θ1 + v2 and θ1⊥v1⊥v2,
the means of all three generating random variables are finite, and the conditions of Fubinis theorem
are satisfied for each random variabile, and the random variables possess nonvanishing characteristic
functions, then the densities of (θ, v1, v2),f(θ), f(v1) and f(v2) , respectively, are identified.
If I average the outcomes for the individuals i over the individuals j, I obtain the expression for
the so-called degree:
Y¯i1 = αi + U¯
1
i ,
Y¯i2 = λ2αi + U¯i2,
Y¯i3 = λ3αi + U¯i3,
Y¯i4 = λ4αi + U¯i4,
Note that in the first equation there is a constraint of λ1 = 1, and the system can be rewritten in
the following manner:
Y¯i1 = αi + U¯
1
i ,
Y¯ik
λk
= αi + U¯∗ik,
where U¯∗ik =
U¯i
λk
and k 6= 1. Thus, we can non parametrically identify the densities of f(α1) and
f(Uk).
For the moment I allow for the following distribution assumptions:
αi
iid
∼ N(0, σ2α)
Ui
iid
∼ N(0, σ2u)
The conditional distributions of the outcome variable for k = 1 is therefore assumed to be:
Yik|αi ∼ N(α,
σ2u
n− 1
)
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and for k 6= 1
Yik|αi ∼ N(λkα,
σ2u
λ2k(n− 1)
)
Note that in this case I assume uncorrelated errors across different measures.
4.5 Likelihood specification
The likelihood function can be defined from (1Y¯i,
2 Y¯i,
3 Y¯i,
4 Y¯i). The joint likelihood function for the
ith individual is given by:
f(yi1, yi2, yi3, yi4) =
∫ + inf
− inf
f(αi)
4∏
k=1
f(yik|αi)dαi
where f(αi) =
1
σα
φ αiσα and f(yik|αi) =
1
σu∗
φ(yik−λkαiσu∗ ). Note that σu∗ =
σ2u
n−1 .
The second piece of the integrand can be developed as follows:
L(Y¯ik;σ
2
u, λ2, λ3, λ4|α1) ≈ (
σ2u
n− 1
)−1/2 exp
(y1 − α1)
2
( 2σ
2
u
n−1)
∗
(
σ2u
n− 1
) 4∏
k=2
1
λ2k
exp

(yk − λkα1)2
2σ2u
λ2
k
(n−1)


the log likelihood function for the ith individual is the following:
l(Y¯ik;σ
2
u, λ2, λ3, λ4|α1) ≈
4
2
logσ2u − 2 ∗ 4logλk +
4∑
k=1
(yi − λkαi)
2σ2u
λk(n−1)
≈ −2logσ2u − 8logλk +
λk(n− 1)
2σ2u
4∑
k=1
(yi − λkαi)
Where λk = 1 if k = 1.
It follows that:
l(Y¯ik;σ
2
u, λ2, λ3, λ4|α1) ≈
≈ −2nlogσ2u − 8nlogλk +
λk(n− 1)
2σ2u
n∑
i=1
4∑
k=1
(yi − λkαi)
Where λk = 1 if k = 1.
43
4.6 Data and results
Data collection strategy was done through Rapid Rural Appraisal Methodology, broadly described
as a systematic but semi-structured activity out in the field by a multidisciplinary team and is de-
signed to obtain new information and to formulate new hypotheses about rural life (see Chambers
(1994)). The compounds, households and individuals were asked to reply jointly on three main sec-
tions of the questionnaires: basic village info, household information and interactions along different
socio-economic dimensions (exchange of labor and production tools, credit and land market, marriage
and kinship relationship and neighborhood information). Information was collected under the form of
census from 60 randomly drawn small villages, out of which 30 treatment and 30 control villages, that
have population < 1000 according to 2003 census) were involved in the sample, that amounts for 3320
households. See appendix A.2 for the descriptive statistics of the sample at micro and macro level.
From the dyadic regressions, it results that there is assortative matching along the individual and
households characteristics. It can be seen that there is a strong preference towards male-male house-
holds exchange. Also large land owners are more likely to engage in land exchange with those who
have small portion of land, especially if the land sum is higher (meaning the richer the landing land
owner). The complete results of dyadic regressions can be found in appendix A.2
Results from Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the WB external shock suggest that there is no dif-
ference in endowments found while there are differences in coefficients through which the external
shock operates (see appendix A.2 for details). This is a strong signal to continue on the research and
underpin the mechanisms through which the WB program works.
4.7 Conclusions and Future Work
Apart from working in an under-explored development country context, this research is quite chal-
lenging because of pretty new dyadic framework, multi directional causality scheme (with at least
4 networks involved), binary outcome and complex unobserved component structure. In my future
sesearch, I intend to use jointly information from adjacency matrices and derive empirical counterparts
of the previously shown model, that would allow me to pin down different channels though which an
external shock alters the existing equlibria in rural areas of the Gambia. I also intend to compare the
results obtain by the above constructed strategy with the results from the existing standard dyadic
regression approach.
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Appendice A
Nigeria Commercial Agriculture
Development Program
Figura A.1: Geographical dispersion of the households in the state of Cross River - GIS satellite
image
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Tabella A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
household size 6.195 2.925
number of minor 2.249 2.135
female HH head 0.119 0.324
age 47.594 12.792
%literate 0.852 0.355
% no edication 0.079 0.27
% primary school 0.262 0.44
% secondary 0.273 0.446
% quranic 0.075 0.263
% owns a car 0.195 0.396
% owns a moto/scooter 0.376 0.485
% hours worked per week 29.504 32.915
yearly income (naira) 330606 1580462
% cultivates rice 0.124 0.33
% cultivates oil palm 0.046 0.208
% cultivates cocoa 0.086 0.28
% cultivates fruit tree 0.071 0.257
% cultivates maize 0.327 0.469
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Figura A.2: Access to electricity and distance to the nearest market (in miles)
Figura A.3: Per capita expenditure and distance to the nearest market (in miles)
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Appendice B
Gambia Community Driven
Development Program
Tabella B.1: Household Level Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Household Size 12.801 12.518 2866
The age of household head 3.899 0.321 2865
% Female HH head 0.066 0.249 2885
% Formal education 0.146 0.353 3254
Polyhamous households 0.402 0.49 3254
Non muslim 0.031 0.173 3254
Emigrants in the hh 0.544 0.498 3254
Kamanyango pachuko 0.047 0.212 3254
Land per workers (in hectars) 2.306 7.425 2858
Per capita income (in thousand dalasies) 3.57 5.134 2851
proportion of agricultural income 0.12 0.237 2852
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Tabella B.2: Village Level Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
village populatation 548.459 177.142
% Illiterate people 0.368 0.21
% not having access to electricity 0.971 0.038
% using public wc 0.371 0.293
% not having access to improved water 0.859 0.235
WB poverty index 0.642 0.097
% in semiurban area 0.112 0.316
N 3254
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Tabella B.3: Dyadic regressions
Land Labor Production Tools Credit
PovertyIndex 0.165 1.046 -0.0131 -0.291
(0.26) (1.93) (-0.03) (-0.40)
Income (sum) -0.0849 -0.0914* -0.0835** -0.0603
(-1.90) (-2.26) (-2.88) (-1.11)
Income (difference) -0.0940 -0.0878 0.0455 0.183
(-1.46) (-1.28) (0.69) (1.74)
Household size (difference) 0.0766 0.144 -0.0640 0.198*
(1.07) (1.71) (-1.18) (2.29)
Household size (sum) 0.324*** 0.418*** 0.371*** 0.445***
(5.65) (7.83) (8.95) (7.18)
Nworkers (difference) -0.0732 -0.283 -0.362* -0.439
(-0.31) (-1.43) (-2.16) (-1.91)
Nworkers (sum) 0.521** 0.334* 0.487*** 0.0858
(3.16) (2.29) (3.64) (0.51)
Land (difference) 0.192*** -0.00196 -0.0172 -0.0242*
(4.84) (-0.18) (-1.95) (-2.30)
Land (sum) 0.151*** 0.0204** 0.0217*** 0.0140
(5.09) (2.64) (3.62) (1.72)
Both muslim -0.0110 0.813** 0.343 0.256
(-0.04) (2.67) (1.36) (1.08)
Both male hh head 0.178 0.464*** 0.703*** 0.456**
(1.29) (3.45) (5.24) (2.82)
Both female hh head -0.294 -1.086 -0.0548 0.479
(-0.58) (-1.51) (-0.10) (1.29)
Both have formal education 0.00818 -0.177 -0.361* -0.0589
(0.04) (-0.84) (-1.99) (-0.29)
Age (difference) 0.0120 0.135 -0.0929 -0.458**
(0.10) (1.12) (-0.90) (-3.07)
Age (sum) 0.151 0.104 -0.0833 -0.0645
(0.95) (1.09) (-1.21) (-0.66)
N 73573 73628 73573 73628
Results of logit regression for binary data, inference accounting for three way clustering
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Tabella B.4: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for Internal links
Land Labor Production Tools Credit
Differential
Prediction 1 -1.397*** -1.335*** -0.653*** -1.516***
(-7.82) (-6.32) (-3.94) (-12.42)
Prediction 2 -1.569*** -0.655*** -0.879** -1.487***
(-7.56) (-3.50) (-2.63) (-6.71)
Difference 0.172 -0.680* 0.226 -0.0293
(0.63) (-2.41) (0.60) (-0.12)
Decomposition
Endowments 0.0516 0.252 0.498 0.476
(0.26) (1.14) (1.31) (1.40)
Coefficients 0.307 -0.371 0.228 -0.0142
(1.33) (-1.46) (0.63) (-0.05)
Interaction -0.186 -0.561 -0.500 -0.491
(-0.86) (-1.95) (-1.27) (-1.45)
N 2768 2776 2765 2771
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Tabella B.5: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for External Links
Land Labor Production Tools Credit
Differential
Prediction 1 -1.694*** -2.689*** -2.217*** -1.653***
(-8.40) (-13.61) (-13.98) (-13.95)
Prediction 2 -3.798*** -4.500*** -3.045*** -2.436***
(-9.36) (-7.33) (-9.45) (-14.11)
Difference 2.104*** 1.812** 0.828* 0.783***
(4.64) (2.81) (2.30) (3.74)
Decomposition
Endowments -0.722 -0.366 -0.132 0.264
(-1.50) (-0.64) (-0.32) (1.05)
Coefficients 1.937*** 1.400* 0.605 0.598**
(3.90) (2.06) (1.41) (2.78)
Interaction 0.889 0.777 0.354 -0.0795
(1.67) (1.25) (0.72) (-0.32)
N 2601 2573 2756 2776
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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